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1 INTRODUCTION 
The structure and regulation of electricity industries 
has changed significantly over the last two decades. 
Most countries have restructured their power sectors 
to separate (to varying degrees) the activities of gen-
eration, network management and energy retail. Fur-
thermore, new weather-dependent renewable genera-
tion has brought about challenges and many open 
questions, especially regarding the affect of these 
changes on the risks related to the reliability of the 
future electrical network.  
Reliability standards for electricity networks are 
traditionally based on a deterministic criterion com-
monly known as ÔN-1Õ (Kirschen 2003, CIGRE WG 
C1.17 2010). This is a rule under which elements in 
operation after a single unplanned outage must be 
capable of accommodating the new operational situ-
ation without violating operational limits (with the 
help of timely and appropriate operator action). This 
deterministic criterion is used to achieve an adequate 
level of reliability (ALR) in a power system. 
1.1 Transmission network utilitiesÕ activities 
Historically, the system operator (SO) has been 
mainly responsible for ensuring that the ALR is 
achieved. In the modern context of an electricity 
market, the SO should also facilitate competition be-
tween producers of electrical energy and procure 
services from different providers on both the genera-
tion and demand sides that allow the system to be 
operated, and should do so in a free and transparent 
way that minimises overall costs. 
 
A transmission owner (TO, which, in some coun-
tries, is integrated with the SO within a Ôtransmis-
sion system operatorÕ or TSO) is responsible for in-
vesting in and maintaining the assets of a power 
system. Thus, it is very important to think of reliabil-
ity across all activities of an SO, TO or TSO: system 
operation, operational planning, asset management 
and system development, the last of which is con-
cerned with the provision of sufficient facilities on 
the network such that it can be operated in accord-
ance with relevant operating criteria.  
Figure 1 shows the activities of transmission utili-
ties across different time horizons. In the shorter 
time scales, e.g. day-ahead or on the day operation, 
the objective of a power system operator is to mini-
mise total operational costs while maintaining an 
ALR. The main uncertainties include: forced outages 
of generation plant and network equipment; varia-
tions in weather that affect the power available from 
renewable generation and the demand for power; 
and market driven exchanges of power between are-
as. In these timescales, the values of many of these 
variables (demand, weather etc.) can be predicted 
with reasonable accuracy and, if the system has been 
sufficiently well planned, can be managed in real 
time operation. However, further out from real-time, 
uncertainties regarding planned outages of equip-
ment to effect maintenance or the repair of defects 
must also be taken into account and weather and 
market behaviour are known with less certainty.  
With many expected changes to future patterns of 
generation and consumption, and the development of 
a ÔsmarterÕ grid that increases the utilisation of a 
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tinguish between risk aversion and disaster aversion. This approach is new in the context of power systems. 
given set of power system assets through increased 
use corrective actions following disturbances and of 
flexible demand and more active management of 
distribution networks, there is a common view that 
the ÔN-1Õ criterion requires revision. From a risk 
perspective, it may seem odd that there is often no 
explicit reference to probability in the definition of 
ÔN-1Õ. However, in the Security and Quality of Sup-
ply Standard (NETS SQSS 2014) applied in Great 
Britain (GB), for example, not all single element 
outages are Ôsecured againstÕ such that there are no 
immediate adverse consequences: certain, less 
common but still ÔcredibleÕ events, e.g. loss of a 
double circuit, are permitted to lead to a limited 
amount of demand disconnection. Moreover, Òif 
there are adverse conditions such that the likelihood 
of a double circuit overhead line fault is significantly 
higher than normalÓ, the system operator should 
configure the system in order that the loss of demand 
consequential to such a fault is less than normal. 
However, no guidance is given on the meaning of 
Òsignificantly higher than normalÓ. Furthermore, the 
ÔN-1Õ criterion may be non-conservative in some 
scenarios due to many potential dependencies be-
tween events, usually neglected, and in other situa-
tions may be overly conservative. Finally, although 
standards like those in GB quantify impact in terms 
of overloading of equipment, voltages or system fre-
quency being outwith limits, poor damping of oscil-
lations following disturbances or one or more gener-
ating units losing synchronism from the rest, the 
final impact on electricity users is often expressed 
only in terms of the initial power consumption that is 
interrupted. This fails to take into account the overall 
societal impact especially for events in which the 
amount of demand affected are large. 
1.2 Contributions of this paper 
This paper provides insights and guidance to those 
areas of power system planning where reliability 
goals can be more effectively achieved. It identifies 
several categories of uncertainties affecting the sys-
tem that the system planner has to design, and we 
discuss a conceptual model depicting these uncer-
tainties. We review standard risk measures that are 
used in power system planning problems and argue 
that such risk measures need to adapt depending on 
the type and location of outages, and that the strate-
gy of Ôone size fits allÕ is no longer appropriate in an 
evolving power system. 
We briefly describe how changes in generation 
and demand patterns in the power sector are forcing 
a reconsideration of the deterministic criterion that is 
used to achieve an ALR and how researchers in at 
least one project, the GARPUR project, are asking 
whether advances in computational capability can 
enable a move away from a deterministic criterion to 
a probabilistic risk-aware criterion. 
In conclusion, the following are the main contri-
butions of this paper: 
¥ a discussion of key drivers of reliability in 
power systems and related actions of power 
system operators; 
¥ a discussion on measurement of risk in the 
context of power system planning; 
¥ exposition of the need for risk models that ad-
equately capture the overall societal impact, 
especially for events with large impacts. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives an introduction to the GARPUR project; 
section 3 briefly describes the system development 
process and the main drivers for investment. Section 
4 discusses common risk measures that are used to 
assess the reliability of a power system. Section 5 re-
flects on the various uncertainties in power system 
planning and operation and proposes new ways in 
which risk in a power system could be quantified. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 THE GARPUR PROJECT 
The authors of this paper are participants in a Euro-
pean FP7 project called GARPUR: Generally Ac-
cepted Reliability Principle with Uncertainty model-
ling and through probabilistic Risk modelling 
(GARPUR 2013). The project is concerned with an 
improved understanding of risk attributes impacting 
power system reliability performance and corre-
sponding metrics that, with new analytical tools, can 
lead to new criteria that can be used by system oper-
ators, asset managers and system developers to im-
prove reliability performance and reduce cost. 
The 4-year GARPUR project was launched in 
September 2013 and consists of 7 TSOs across Eu-
rope and 12 research and innovation partners. One 
key deliverable to date has been a formalisation of 
the way in which possible disturbances or unplanned 
events Ð ÔcontingenciesÕ Ð are identified which the 
system operator should take into account when op-
erating the system, i.e. should be ÔsecuredÕ against. 
This is concerned with estimation of the Ôresidual 
riskÕ associated with the disturbances or variations 
that are not taken into account, i.e. are disregarded 
by the system operator (Karangelos & Wehenkel, 
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Figure 1: Activities of a TSO across the three time horizons 
2016). Within this description, the ÔN-1Õ criterion 
secures against all single element outages but disre-
gards all other variations. An explicit consideration 
of the residual risk opens the way to adaptation of 
the set of secured events in accordance with chang-
ing background conditions, e.g. changing probabili-
ties of faults or short-term variations of output from 
weather-dependent renewables.  
The authors of this paper are primarily involved 
in the system development part of the project Ð 
Work Package 4 (WP4) Ð and hence the focus of 
this paper is on risk from the planning perspective. 
WP4 is concerned with an assessment of the risks 
that planners need to consider in the system devel-
opment process. Network planners need to deliver a 
future grid that can be managed resiliently, and cur-
rently can only use planning tools that give them 
partial insight into the operation of, and demands 
upon, the future grid. There is a need for the devel-
opment of new risk metrics that are fairly simple, 
yet still broadly reflect the societal impact of large 
scale outages and hence allow for an improved as-
sessment of overall risk that can help inform future 
investment decisions. 
3 SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN 
ELECTRICTY NETWORKS 
The general role of a system development planner is 
to ensure that sufficient facilities are installed on the 
system to enable it to be operated in accordance with 
relevant operating standards. In particular, the sys-
tem development planner should ensure that the sys-
temÕs capability to transfer power from producer to 
consumer is sufficient. Because any insufficiency 
may require investment in the networkÕs facilities 
and such investments take time, the system devel-
opment process is commonly identified with time-
scales of a year or more ahead of real time operation, 
and therefore it is often described as a long-term 
planning problem. 
3.1 Components of power network costs 
The total cost of a power network may be described 
as consisting of the following parts (Bell 2015): 
¥ the cost of network infrastructure and the cost 
of maintaining it (I); 
¥ the cost of operating the system (O); 
¥ the cost to consumers of unreliability of elec-
tricity supply (X) 
The goal of a system planner is to minimise the 
overall expected cost (I + O + X) over some given 
period of time. In the time-scales in which invest-
ment in network infrastructure takes place, the plan-
ner must deliver a network that can be operated reli-
ably, and must be mindful of future O + X. A 
relative lack of investment in network infrastructure 
would lead either to greater O (the wholesale elec-
tricity marketÕs access to its preferred generation is 
restricted which implies that other, higher cost gen-
eration should run) or greater X (some additional 
loss of supply takes place from time to time which 
has some economic and social impact). Clearly, in 
quantifying the anticipated future values of O and X 
for a given network infrastructure, account must be 
taken of the way in which the system is operated. 
This includes use of new control facilities such as 
special protection schemes, demand side manage-
ment or actively managed distribution.  
Figure 2 shows that overall cost will generally in-
crease as the reliability of a system is increased 
(Wang & Singh 2009). However, below a certain 
value of reliability index, the increasing costs of un-
reliability dominate. Total cost is at a minimum at 
R*, which determines the optimal level of reliability.  
The uncertainties that affect system development 
are greater than those that apply, for example, in 
system operation. Thus, a key objective for a system 
planner is to identify efficient improvements to the 
system development process that provide benefits in 
terms of better management of risk without impos-
ing an excessive burden on business processes and 
analysts. The balance sought should make more ex-
plicit use of probabilistic information on operating 
conditions and disturbances than is common at pre-
sent and use appropriate metrics to: 
¥ identify how much modelling is required to 
give sufficient confidence with respect to as-
sessment of future operation of the system for 
a given generation capacity/demand/market 
scenario; 
¥ make use of information on system perfor-
mance from a set of scenarios to identify and 
justify any investments in new network facili-
ties that are required. 
3.2 The two drivers of investments in transmission  
In respect of facilitating system operation in accord-
ance with operating standards, the following two 
drivers may be noted: 
¥ provision of power transfer capability such 
that the demand for electricity in a given area 
can be met with a given, minimum level of re-
liability, i.e. reliability driven capability; 
Figure 2: A graph showing relationship between reliabil-
ity and overall cost of power system.  
¥ provision of power transfer capability such 
that demand for electricity on the system can 
be met, over the medium to long term, in an 
economically efficient manner, i.e. economics 
driven capability. 
Economics driven investment involves an as-
sessment of relative costs and benefits of investment 
in enhancement of power transfer capability com-
pared with network congestion and running of ex-
pensive, Ôout of meritÕ generation.  
4 COMMON METRICS USED TO EVALUTE 
RELIABILITY OF POWER SYSTEMS 
Due to the integrated nature of power systems, it is 
possible for failures in any part of the system to 
cause severe disruptions. These disruptions can be 
very costly to the electricity market and society. Ide-
ally, supply should be made continuously to custom-
ers but that is expensive and arguably not feasible. 
Due to the random nature of failure, it is accepted 
that any real-world system will have a non-zero risk 
of suffering power outages. The risk can be reduced, 
for example, by installing more reliable equipment, 
having more redundancy on the network or by 
providing additional capacity as generation reserves, 
but always at additional cost. Given the complexities 
of power systems, the trade-off between costs and 
benefits of different interventions commonly de-
pends on particular metrics, outlined below. 
4.1 The capacity margin 
The capacity margin is the proportion by which the 
total expected available electricity generation ex-
ceeds the maximum expected level of demand at the 
time at which that demand occurs (NETS SQSS 
2012). A positive capacity margin acts as an insur-
ance against occasional unexpected losses of genera-
tion or increases in demand and is normally ex-
pressed as the percentage calculated by: 
MC =
GC −Dpeak
Dpeak
×100
                  
(1) 
where MC denotes the capacity margin, GC is the to-
tal capacity of generation installed on the system and 
Dpeak is the annual peak value of total demand. 
 The capacity margin has been used to give an in-
dication of how much generation capacity should be 
built in order to have a certain level of reliability of 
supply. However, it does not take into account the 
limitations of the network and does not distinguish 
between different types of generation, e.g. thermal, 
hydro and wind that have very different average 
available power. Transfers of power on intercon-
nectors, i.e. transmission connections between dif-
ferent countries, should also be taken into account.  
4.2 The derated capacity margin 
As not all generation capacity will have the same 
availability or always be able run at its theoretical 
maximum, in order to remove some of the limita-
tions in the measure of capacity margin, sometimes 
de-rated capacities are used when calculating a de-
rated capacity margin. The British regulator for gas 
and electricity, Ofgem, lists de-rated capacity factors 
for different type of generators in their capacity as-
sessment reports (Ofgem 2013). 
4.3 Loss of load probability 
Loss of load probability (LOLP) is another common 
measure that is used to evaluate reliability of power 
system and is defined as the probability of the sys-
tem demand exceeding the available generation. The 
LOLP is usually calculated for each year using the 
annual peak demand. However, it is sometimes 
quoted for each day using the peak demand of the 
day or on an hourly basis using the peak demand of 
each hour. It characterizes the adequacy of genera-
tion to meet the total expected peak demand. Math-
ematically, LOLP can be defined as follows: 
LOLP = P Dpeak > AG( )                   ( 2 ) 
where Dpeak is total peak demand of the system and 
AG is the total power generation available at the time 
of the peak. 
4.4 Loss of load expectation 
Loss of load expectation (LOLE) represents the 
number of hours per annum in which, over the long-
term, it is statistically expected that supply will not 
meet demand (Billinton & Allan 1996). Mathemati-
cally, LOLE is defined as follows: 
LOLE = LOLP ! T            (3) 
where T is the time period. Usually T is taken as 
8760 hours and LOLP as the loss of load probability 
for each hour that models the loss of load expecta-
tion in hours per year. As part of the Electricity 
Market Reform in Great Britain, the UK Govern-
ment has set a reliability standard of 3 hours LOLE 
per year (Ofgem 2013), used to identify the amount 
of generation capacity to be bought in a 2 or 3-year 
ahead capacity market. In practice, the standard used 
in the GB capacity market reflects not the number of 
hours in which interruptions to supply to electricity 
users might be expected but the number of hours in 
which the system operator might be expected to take 
emergency actions to address a shortfall of available 
generation relative to demand. Disconnection of 
some amount of demand is among the possible ac-
tions but is only a last resort after using contracted 
demand side reductions, decreases of interconnector 
exports, increases in interconnector imports, 
ÔmaxgenÕ (the ability of some generators to exceed 
their normal rating for a short period of time), and 
demand reduction through a decrease in the voltage 
supplied to electricity users through the distribution 
networks (Bell 2014). 
4.5 Expected energy not supplied 
A final metric that is in common use takes account 
of both the initial power interruption and the time 
taken to restore supply in a quantification of the total 
energy that is not supplied to electricity users. It is 
known as expected energy not supplied (EENS) and 
is calculated as follows (Wang 2008): 
���� ! !!760! !!!����!!!!!               (4) 
where !! is the amount of energy curtailed and 
���!! is the corresponding loss of load probability . 
What the Great Britain system operator National 
Grid reports as a ÔreliabilityÕ of 99.99999% for the 
year 2014/15 (National Grid 2014) is best under-
stood as the energy supplied after the occurrence of 
faults originating on the transmission system, ex-
pressed relative to the total energy that would have 
been supplied had the transmission faults not oc-
curred. One limitation of the metric is the necessity 
to estimate the total energy that would have been 
supplied. (Due to the occurrence of the most fre-
quent cause of interruptions to supply, i.e. faults on 
the distribution network, the overall reliability of 
supply for the GB power system as a whole is less 
than the National Grid figure). 
4.6 Limitations of the existing reliability measures 
The problem with the reliability measures described 
here is that they indicate problems in the system but 
do not indicate the severity of each problem and 
therefore are not very meaningful. For example, they 
do not take into account whether there were many 
short periods of lost load or a few long periods. Se-
cond, they do not take account of how much load 
was lost each time. Third, they do not look at any 
follow on consequences. Further, in calculations of 
these metrics, it is commonly assumed that data 
about demand and generation capacity are perfectly 
accurate and that the generation on a system is infi-
nitely flexible (i.e., generation can ramp-up or ramp-
down freely and rapidly) or that the system operator 
always has so much notice of a potential shortfall of 
generation relative to demand that it can dispatch 
additional available generation in sufficient time. 
Such assumptions are not true in reality. 
5 MANAGEMENT OF RISK 
From the perspective of a system planner, a system 
design choice will turn out poorly if: 
1. in its planned-for state, the system suffers from 
interruptions to supply more frequently or with 
greater size than was expected; or 
2. in its planned-for state, the system frequently 
operates at a cost above the theoretical expected 
optimum; or 
3. changes in demand and/or generation are not 
anticipated in sufficient time to create the ap-
propriate infrastructure, leading to unplanned 
interruptions to supply and/or higher costs. 
The first two of these consequences are the re-
sults of aleatory uncertainties regarding demand, in-
frastructure state and environmental conditions, 
which impact on the ability of the operator to man-
age the system. The third point relates to state of 
knowledge uncertainty about the future development 
of the overall system. A further state of knowledge 
uncertainty arises from approximations used in 
modelling system responses to disturbances. 
These risks are mitigated in practice in a number 
of ways. Most obviously the system operator takes 
actions to ensure that the system stays within limits 
Ð this may involve allowing, for example, thermal 
loads on lines to temporarily exceed the usual norms 
(defined in terms of continuous loading), or moder-
ate rises in voltages may be tolerated for a short 
time. In the case of excess costs of operation, the 
main course of mitigation is investment to reduce 
overall costs in the longer term. This might involve 
new, cheaper generation or additional network ca-
pacity to reduce congestion. However, in a liberal-
ised electricity industry, investment in generation 
capacity is not within the scope of the network plan-
ner, though planners play an important role in sig-
nalling potential issues and opportunities. 
Taking account of the risks which are mitigated, 
the system planner is mainly concerned with the re-
sidual technical risks, either arising in the planned-
for state, or arising from changes that were reasona-
bly foreseeable. In order to assess these risks, we 
need to be able to model rates at which the system 
deviates from its desired performance despite rea-
sonable interventions of the system operator. 
In the context of risk management, risk models re-
fer to the use of quantitative or statistical methods to 
determine the aggregate risk based on a set of fore-
seeable future operating conditions. Risk assessment 
is an essential tool for a system planner to identify 
potential intervention where the most significant 
lowering of risks can be achieved. The objective of 
managing risk is to decrease the probability of 
events that have an adverse impact, decrease their 
impact, or both. For this reason, probability models 
are required to take account of conditional probabili-
ties among various factors that influence the operat-
ing conditions of a power system. Further, in order 
to build an adequate risk model, it is important to 
take account of the overall societal impact. 
5.1 Uncertainty in future operating conditions 
In order to quantify the impact of an event, it is nec-
essary to know the initial conditions of a system, i.e. 
its initial operating state, and the available corrective 
actions. In the context of a power system, this means 
the location and levels of demand and generation, 
the network topology, available corrective controls 
and also the reliability criterion, e.g. ÔN-1Õ, used by 
the system operator to decide the operating state. 
The system planner should anticipate a range of 
conditions that might be faced by the system opera-
tor and whether they are likely to have sufficient fa-
cilities available to allow those conditions to be 
managed in accordance with the prevailing reliabil-
ity criterion.  
The functional dependence of an operating state 
of a power system can be characterized by endoge-
nous and exogenous variables. The bottom-most 
boxes in Figure 3 are exogenous variables while the 
rest are endogenous. The planned outages box in 
Figure 3 refers to maintenance of transmission and 
generation equipment. The planned outages that 
might be allowed depend on the expected operating 
state of the system; the operational planner can 
move them forward or backward in time depending 
on the expected operating conditions and various 
other factors, whilst maintaining a reliable system. 
Unplanned outages refer to the random events that 
cause outages of generation and/or transmission 
components. In Figure 3 this is shown by a dotted 
line because a system operator has no control over 
their timing or location. 
It can be seen from Figure 3 that demand for pow-
er depends on the weather and, because demand has 
diurnal and seasonal dependencies, the time of the 
day. Similarly, generation from wind turbines and 
solar panels depend largely on the weather. For sys-
tem planning studies and in system operation, it is 
very important to take proper account of temporal 
and spatial correlations between variables and of 
wholesale market preferences for how demand is to 
be met. 
Various models of power system responses to dis-
turbances exist, e.g. load flow, which are used by the 
planners. However, such models need to be used 
within a broader set of scenarios which are designed 
to explore the conditional risk levels in settings 
which can easily arise. System planners use these 
tools to evaluate different options for investment in 
new facilities. With the need to model so many dif-
ferent situations, a range of tools is used in practice 
with different levels of precision in order to refine 
the set of options under consideration. Finally, a de-
cision must be made on whether to invest and in 
which options to do so. Although different frame-
works for decision making have been proposed, e.g. 
min-max regret as discussed in (Fang & Hill 2003) 
or a multi-objective approach as in (Karimi & 
Ebrahimi 2015), suitable metrics of the risks associ-
ated with different events are still required. 
5.2 Measurement of risk 
Historically, power system planners have managed 
risk by setting thresholds and safety margins at lev-
els determined by industry experience, e.g. the ÔN-1Õ 
rule. Although attempts have been made to quantify 
a Ôvalue of lost loadÕ or Ôcustomer damage func-
tionsÕ (see, for example, Kariuki and Allan 1996 and 
de Nooij 2007), because of the complexity of as-
sessing the economic and social impact of outages, 
not least the difficulty of modelling the time and du-
ration of outages, there is Ð as yet Ð no overall for-
mulaic approach that optimises the expected eco-
nomic and social benefits of investment in the 
network against the investment costs. Such an ap-
proach would in any case be far too burden-some for 
the optioneering stages of the system design process. 
An alternative is to look for risk heuristics which 
broadly reflect what the societal impact would be of 
different kinds of outages. 
It is worth making an analogy with risk tolerance 
concepts used in Health and Safety (H&S) settings. 
Figure 4 shows three regions of risk tolerance. In a 
H&S context the upper line is the limit of tolerable 
risk. Risks above that level are not acceptable and 
will not be traded against the cost. Below the thresh-
old line is the tolerable region, commonly known as 
the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
region. The risk of an event in ALARP is tolerable 
only if risk reduction is impracticable or its cost is 
disproportionate to the improvement gained. The re-
gion below the solid line at the bottom is the broadly 
acceptable region because either the probability of 
an event is negligibly small or the impact is very 
small. In a safety context, risks above the upper line 
are not tolerated, risks below the lower line do not 
have to be considered in trade off analyses (though 
this does not remove the general obligation to follow 
good practice), and risk in the ALARP region should 
be managed through trade-off studies. The analogies 
with power system planning are not exact, but, for 
example, there is an upper limit of 3 hours LOLE for 
insufficiency of generation in the GB system 
(Ofgem 2013). The system planner will not be con-
Figure 3: Components of an operating state. 
cerned with minor outages that should be dealt with 
by normal good operational practice, and hence 
there is an analogy to the lower limit. The system 
planner is mainly concerned with cost effectively 
dealing with risk in the middle region.  
In a power system context, there is the risk of cas-
cading outages that can follow a significant disturb-
ance and can lead very rapidly to a large-scale 
blackout from which recovery is technically chal-
lenging and time-consuming (IEEE 2007). Moreo-
ver, the impact to society of complete loss of power 
Ð loss of communications, heating, cooling, lighting, 
electric transport, water and sewage pumping, traffic 
management systems, etc. Ð is very much larger than 
partial loss of power (Southwell 2014). For this rea-
son, it is very important to distinguish the risks be-
tween many small disturbances and a single infre-
quent large disturbance. 
5.3 Resilience and disutility 
ÔResilienceÕ of a system can defined as its ability to 
recovery from shocks or challenges. Societal resili-
ence against many small outages, but lack of resili-
ence to large ones suggests that a non-linear 
weighting can provide a reasonable and practical ap-
proach to measuring risk. Similar challenges exist in 
Health and Safety risk measurement. Indeed, there is 
a well-established literature that looks at FN curves 
and criteria lines, and at risk measures that give a 
non-linear weighting to larger sizes of accidents.  
Wilson (Wilson 1975) and Okrent (Okrent 1981) 
introduced a criterion that could be used to distin-
guish between one single large event and many 
small events. Okrent considered how to measure the 
overall risk posed by continuing use of an industrial 
installation or system, in which a sequence of acci-
dents with differing numbers of fatalities might (in 
principle) occur throughout its operating life. 
The criterion proposed by Wilson and Okrent is 
called a Ôdisutility criterionÕ and is effectively a 
summary statistic for group risk. The disutility d is 
defined as: 
! ! !!!!
!
!!!                                      (4) 
where fn is the annual frequency of accidents involv-
ing n fatalities and α is a risk aversion factor. When 
α = 1, this is simply the expected number of fatali-
ties per year. Okrent suggested that 1.4 was a rea-
sonable choice reflecting societal aversion to large 
accidents.  
A more recent treatment is given by Bedford 
(Bedford 2013) who showed that the approach sug-
gested by Okrent, despite its attractions, did not do 
what Okrent was seeking to achieve, and provided a 
broader framework in which both disaster aversion 
(i.e., aversion to large accidents) and uncertainty 
aversion (i.e., unwillingness to gamble) could both 
be modelled. As Bedford pointed out, the formula is 
not really risk averse (as Okrent described it) when α 
> 1 but is actually disaster averse. Since there are of-
ten large uncertainties about the frequency of large 
fatality accidents it is of interest to understand how 
to modify the calculation to reflect risk aversion to 
uncertainty in the rate. Bedford shows how this can 
be done, giving, for example, a two parameter fami-
ly where one parameter controls disaster aversion 
(our aversion to large accidents) and the other con-
trols risk aversion  (our aversion to uncertainty about 
the rate of incidents of any kind). 
Similar concepts would seem to be applicable also 
in the context of risk measurement for power sys-
tems. The impacts of very large outages are enor-
mous and difficult to quantify because of the diffi-
culty of identifying and assessing all the knock-on 
consequences. This suggests that large outages 
should be weighted non-linearly more than small 
outages which have a less disruptive effect on socie-
ty. However, the down-side of using a power law as 
suggested by Okrent is that the measure becomes 
very sensitive to uncertainties about the frequencies 
of very low frequency events. By definition, these 
are very difficult to credibly assess. Furthermore, 
however, one could argue that society is similarly 
averse to all very large outages, suggesting that out-
age size impact grows less strongly once in the class 
of very large outages. Also, the measures that can be 
taken to reduce the probabilities of different very 
large outages are the same, so differentiation be-
tween sizes of very large outages does not necessari-
ly help in determining optimal strategies. This sug-
gests using a disutility function that has a power law 
with α > 1 for low to large size outages but which 
then switches to a different power law behaviour 
with α < 1 for large to very large outages. The size 
of the outage may be measured in terms of the num-
ber of consumers losing power or the total load ini-
tially lost. Appropriate values of α can be deter-
mined by risk analysts through the use of standard 
preference questions with, for example, system 
planners to assess their implied preferences. 
The use of a simple risk metric like this can be 
used in conjunction with a simulation system based 
on the factors set out in Figure 3 to provide sum-
mary feed-back to system planners in the optioneer-
ing and assessment phases of system planning. Fur-
thermore, the use of two classes of outage and 
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Figure 4: Tolerability of risk  
recognition of disaster aversion can help to identify 
and justify measures to reduce the size of a major 
disturbance even if its probability of occurrence 
cannot be quantified with any confidence or reduced 
significantly. The set of measures that a power sys-
tem planner can consider forms a Ôdefence planÕ and 
includes such interventions as automatic under-
frequency load shedding and planned system island-
ing (CIGRE WG C1.17 2009). 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of power system development planning 
is to enable future operation of the system in accord-
ance with appropriate system operation rules or con-
ventions. One such convention that has been com-
monly used in power systems to date is the ÔN-1Õ 
criterion that states that system limits should still be 
respected even after the unplanned outage of any 
one element of the system. Proper consideration of 
various uncertainties and risks to system operation is 
an important part of the business case for any system 
development plan. The different impacts that differ-
ent disturbances on a power system might have been 
discussed. The worst case is that supply of power to 
electricity users is interrupted without their consent. 
A number of risk metrics commonly used in power 
system planning and operation have been described 
and argued to be inadequate in respect of capturing 
the differences between large and small interruptions 
to supply of power, and long and short duration out-
ages. It has been further argued these differences are 
highly material in terms of societal impact and the 
duration and technical difficulty of recovery. 
As a consequence of the above, we propose the 
construction of risk models that take better account 
of the overall societal impact than simple loss of 
load metrics do within many electricity transmission 
network utilities currently. The societal impact 
should take account of frequencies of events with 
different levels of consequences, for example be-
tween multiple small events and a single large event. 
Due to the difficulty of modelling the size and dura-
tion of outages, we also propose the use of a Òdisutil-
ity criterionÓ based on quantities that can be quite 
readily modelled by system planners and used as a 
proxy for impact that reflects Ôdisaster aversionÕ. 
However, because such a metric can be very sensi-
tive to assumed frequencies of events, we also sug-
gest an approach which primarily sensitive to the 
difference between small and large events, with less 
emphasis on the differences between alternative very 
large events (which are inherently highly uncertain 
in magnitude but all highly disruptive). 
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